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11. Introduction
At the time of an initial public offering (IPO) the owner-manager seeks to raise capital
from outside investors or to cash out part of his shareholdings. Even after the firm has
gone public, the entrepreneur often acts as the controlling owner and manager. This
creates an agency conflict between the owner-manager and minority shareholders
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
In this study, we examine the impact of the controlling position of French owner-
managers on IPO firm value. The agency conflict is especially severe in France because
of its poor legal protection of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). In addition,
France is a country characterized by concentrated ownership and large private benefits of
control (Johnson et al., 2000). In particular, Fanto (1998) documents that French
managers have a responsibility to serve the social interest (intérêt social) rather than
shareholder interests. Alcouffe (2000) argues that this principle of social interest
increases managerial discretion and encourages the owner-manager to pursue his own
interests usually at the expense of minority shareholders.
We analyze a sample of 299 IPOs on the Paris Bourse from January 1993 to
December 1999. We study IPO firms because the position of their owner-managers
closely matches the situation in Jensen and Meckling (1976), where an existing owner-
manager attempts to sell equity to outside investors. Outside investors know that the
owner-manager may take actions that are not in their best interest. In practice, the IPO
prospectus often mentions this as one of the risk factors associated with investing in IPO
shares1. Therefore, investors are likely to anticipate the agency costs and ‘price protect’
themselves. This ‘price protection’ shows up as a discount on firm value.
                                                          
1 For example: “The controlling shareholder will have the ability to determine the outcome of matters
submitted to our shareholders for approval at the general meeting, including the election and removal of
directors and any merger, consolidation or sale of all or substantially all of our assets. Such control and
concentration of ownership may affect the market price of the securities and may lead to a conflict with
minority shareholders.” (translated from the IPO prospectus of RISC Technology dated 9 November 2000,
page 68).
2The owner-manager can mitigate the agency problem by bonding mechanisms
that better align his interests with those of the minority shareholders. Post-IPO cash flow
ownership is one of these bonding mechanisms. Because the owner-manager bears direct
wealth consequences from his decisions through his cash flow ownership, private
benefits of control become costly to him and will be reduced (La Porta et al, 2002). This
is called the incentive effect of the owner-manager’s controlling position and is expected
to have a positive effect on firm value. In addition, shareholder agreements have the
potential to limit expropriation of minority shareholders (Chemla et al., 2002). These
shareholder agreements are private contracts among shareholders with the purpose to
share control among pre-IPO owners and are expected to enhance IPO firm value.
However, the incentive effect associated with cash flow ownership might be
offset by an entrenchment effect. Large private benefits of control make it desirable to
maintain a lock on control. In France, this lock can be maintained by separating votes
from cash flow rights by employing pyramidal structures and double voting rights. In
theory, this increases the agency conflict between the owner-manager and minority
shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2000). We hypothesize that investors will anticipate larger
agency costs if post-IPO control by the owner-manager is high, and that they will ‘price-
protect’ themselves through a larger discount on IPO firm value.
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we extend recent studies
dealing with ownership and control in IPO firms. For example, Smart and Zutter (2003)
examine the use of dual class share structures by U.S. IPO firms. They find that the dual
class IPOs sell at lower price-to-sales ratios than single class IPOs. Field and Karpoff
(2002) show that managers of U.S. IPO firms are more likely to use takeover defenses
when they have large private benefits of control. Unlike these studies, we are able to
disentangle incentive and entrenchment effects associated with controlling owner-
managers. Second, we examine the use of shareholder agreements between the owner-
manager and other pre-IPO shareholders. French IPO prospectuses contain detailed
descriptions of these shareholder agreements, an institutional detail that allows us to
3deepen our analysis. Third, we investigate whether (non-pecuniary) private benefits
motivate French owner-managers to keep a lock on control. In particular, we examine
proxies for nepotism, status and prestige.
We find that the cash flow ownership of the owner-manager is positively related
to IPO firm value (consistent with an incentive effect), whereas the power he derives
from his cash flow ownership is negatively related to IPO firm value (consistent with an
entrenchment effect). The use of shareholder agreements is positively related to IPO firm
value. This is consistent with shareholder agreements reducing expropriation of minority
shareholders. Finally, we document that non-pecuniary private benefits are higher when
the owner-manager retains full control of the IPO firm.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section two develops
hypotheses. Section three presents the data and methods. Section four discusses the
results. Section five concludes.
2. Hypothesis development
2.1. Cash flow ownership of the owner-manager
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the owner-manager will consume more private
benefits once he has sold shares to the public. This creates an agency problem. Outside
investors will try to moderate the consumption of these private benefits through costly
monitoring. As long as prospective shareholders form rational expectations about the
actions of the owner-manager, the price they are willing to pay for the shares will reflect
these agency costs. The owner-manager therefore bears the expected agency costs to the
extent he owns shares in the company and trades off these costs against the utility he
derives from his private benefits (Bebchuk, 1999). The principal-agent model of Jensen
and Meckling (1976) predicts a positive relation between management stock ownership
and firm value. If managers own more stock in the employing company, they internalize
4a larger fraction of the costs associated with their shirking and perk consumption. As a
result, the incentives to consume private benefits are reduced and firm value is increased
(La Porta et al., 2002). Building on this research, we hypothesize,
Hypothesis 1a. Post-IPO cash flow ownership of the owner-manager is positively related
to IPO firm value.
However, the theoretical model of Stulz (1988) predicts that the relationship
between cash flow ownership and firm value is non-linear. As cash flow ownership and
control of the owner-manager increase beyond a certain threshold, a negative effect on
firm value associated with the ability to block value-enhancing takeovers (i.e.,
entrenchment) may dominate the incentive benefits associated with cash flow ownership.
Accordingly, McConnell and Servaes (1990) report a curvilinear relationship between
firm value and management ownership. As predicted by principal-agent theory, the
relation is positive at low levels of ownership, since the owner-manager has an incentive
to maximize value as his ownership increases. However, if his ownership gets larger, it
becomes more difficult for outside shareholders to control him. The owner-manager may
therefore, after a point, become entrenched and indulge his preferences for private
benefits such as shirking and perk consumption that reduce firm value. Hence,
Hypothesis 1b. Post-IPO cash flow ownership of the owner-manager has a curvilinear
relationship with IPO firm value.
2.2. Mechanisms to separate voting rights from cash flow rights
A controlling owner may treat himself preferentially at the expense of other investors,
especially if his voting power is significantly larger than his cash flow ownership.
Bebchuk (1999) develops a rent protection theory of corporate ownership and control. In
5his theory, an owner-manager has to decide whether he stays in control when the
company goes public. If the private benefits of control are large and transferable, the
owner-manager decides to keep a lock on control. If he left control contestable, rival
management teams would seize power of the company to capture these large private
control rents. As a result, publicly traded companies tend to have a controlling owner in
countries where private benefits of control are large (La Porta et al., 1999).
Bebchuk et al. (2000) show that the separation of cash flow and voting rights has
the potential to create very large agency costs. This separation allows a controlling
shareholder to maintain a lock on control without holding the majority of cash flow
rights. It also makes holding a lock on control less expensive because it does not require
controlling owners to forego the benefits of diversification to the same extent as under a
‘one share-one vote’ rule. As a result, the controlling owner does not internalize a large
fraction of the wealth consequences of his decisions through his cash flow ownership.
For example, the owner-manager can adopt a dual class equity structure. Under dual
class equity, the owner-manager retains high voting shares and sells lower voting shares
to the public.
Alternatively, pyramid structures allow the controlling shareholder to exercise
control through a chain of companies. In a two-tier pyramid structure, a controlling
shareholder holds a controlling vote in a holding company that in turn holds a controlling
stake in an operating company. Several more layers can be added, which allows the
owner at the top of the pyramid to control all the companies in the pyramid structure
with an increasingly small investment in each firm further down the pyramid. This
effectively separates voting and cash flow ownership. Grossman and Hart (1988)
theoretically show that the separation of ownership and voting rights can lower
shareholders’ value. We therefore hypothesize,
Hypothesis 2. The extent of separation between cash flow rights and voting rights in the
hands of the owner-manager is negatively related to IPO firm value.
62.3. Sharing control
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) theoretically show that multiple large shareholders –
none of which can control the firm without agreeing with one or more of the other
shareholders – may limit expropriation of minority shareholders. Because none of the
shareholders is large enough to be in unilateral control, they need to form coalitions in
order to obtain majority control. Such coalitions, by aggregating the cash flow ownership
of their members, internalize the wealth consequences of their actions to a larger extent
than their individual members do. As a result, the consumption of value-reducing private
benefits of control is reduced. Similarly, Gomes and Novaes (2001) show that, by
sharing control with other large shareholders, the owner-manager limits the expropriation
of minority shareholders. This effect arises from the bargaining problems associated with
multiple large shareholders. A large shareholder will not agree to lower firm value
because of the private benefits that another large shareholder might enjoy.
Shareholder agreements are an example of a private contract among shareholders
with the purpose to share control and limit expropriation. They may include several
clauses. For example, pre-emptive rights that give precedence to contracting shareholders
in buying each other’s stakes at fair value, drag-along rights that allow contracting
shareholders to force one another to join them in selling their shares to an acquirer and
pooling (or voting) agreements that allow each contracting shareholder to nominate a
certain number of candidates for the board of directors. Chemla et al. (2002) theoretically
show that shareholder agreements preserve the incentive to make ex ante investments
and minimize ex post transfers. We therefore hypothesize that shareholder agreements
have a positive impact on IPO firm value.
Hypothesis 3. The presence of shareholder agreements is positively related to IPO firm
value.
7Building on the previous research, we argue that an owner-manager is likely to
enjoy larger private benefits of control if he does not have to reach an agreement or form
a coalition with other shareholders. We expect that investors anticipate the larger
propensity to consume private control benefits once the owner-manager shares limited or
no power with other shareholders. According to agency theory, investors then engage in
‘price-protection’ and reduce the price they are willing to pay for the shares. We call this
the ‘entrenchment’ effect. This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. The strength of the post-IPO power of the owner-manager vis-à-vis other
shareholders is negatively related to IPO firm value.
2.4. Private benefits of control
Coffee (2001) defines private benefits of control as: “all the ways in which those in
control of a corporation can siphon off benefits to themselves that are not shared by the
other shareholders” (page 9). These private benefits of control are inherently difficult to
measure directly. Nenova (2003) uses price differences between two classes of stock
with identical cash flow rights but differing voting rights to measure private benefits, and
finds that control rents are larger in countries with poor investor protection. Dyck and
Zingales (2004) measure private benefits as the difference between prices paid in a
control block purchase and market prices. They find that private benefits are associated
with less developed capital markets and more concentrated ownership. Field and Karpoff
(2002) show that managers of U.S. IPO firms are more likely to use takeover defenses
when they have large private benefits of control in the form of cash compensation.
These prior studies focus on monetary private benefits of control that are
transferable to an outside acquirer. However, non-monetary or psychic private benefits
may be equally important. These psychic private benefits include status, prestige and
8amenities that are not easily transferred to other owners. For example, one of the
privileges of control is the owner-manager’s ability to employ family members and to
appoint them on the board (nepotism). Family board members may be problematic, both
in executive and in non-executive roles. First, Barth et al. (2005) report that firms run by
family executives are less productive than firms (including family firms) run by
professional managers. Second, non-executive family directors are indebted to the
owner-manager and less likely to discipline him because of the consequences that these
actions have on family relationships inside the firm and among the extended family
outside the company (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003) find that
German family firms are more likely to adopt dual class shares structures when the firm
is an important employer in a small town (status and prestige).
Preservation of private benefits of control is costly, because concentrated
ownership may force the owner-manager to be not well diversified. Thus, if he is willing
to bear the loss of diversification and remain in full control, the private benefits of
control are expected to be large (Bebchuck, 1999).
Hypothesis 5. Private benefits are larger when the owner-manager is in full control.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Sample and data collection
We start with the complete universe of French IPO firms from January 1993 to
December 1999. IPO firms are identified by L’Année Boursière, an annual publication of
the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF). Following Derrien and Womack (2003), we
exclude 21 domestic firms that listed on the Premier Marché (the most prestigious listing
venue in France), because they generally involve privatization, equity carve-outs or spin-
offs. Twenty-eight firms that transferred from the Marché hors-cote (an OTC market that
9existed until 1998), or that previously traded on a foreign stock market, are excluded
because their price discovery is straightforward. We drop twelve financial services firms
(SIC codes 6000-6999) because their reporting environments are different from those of
other IPO firms. For the same reason, nine firms that listed either on one of the six
regional stock exchanges (Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseilles, Nantes, and Nancy) or on
the Marché Libre (an unregulated trading platform in France) are dropped. The filters
result in a sample of 299 non-financial French firms that go public on either the Nouveau
Marché (98 firms) or the Second Marché (201 firms) of the Paris Bourse. The sample is
nearly equally divided in manufacturing (100 firms), non-financial services (112 firms)
and high-tech industries (87 firms)2.
3.2. Variable measurement
3.2.1. Firm and offer characteristics
Table 1 presents descriptive characteristics. Offer prices and financial statement numbers
are taken from prospectuses3. Market value is measured as the number of shares
outstanding after the IPO times the closing price on the first-day of trading. Market
prices are collected from Datastream. The median market value on the first day of trade
amounts to €41 million with a minimum of €10.7 million and a maximum of €827
                                                          
2 Manufacturing companies are active in SIC codes starting with 15, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28 (not
283), 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 (not 357), 36 (not 365, 366, 367), 37 (not 376), 38 (not 382, 384) and 39. Non-
financial services firms operate in SIC codes starting with 42, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 70, 72,
73 (not 737), 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 84, 87 (not 8731), and 89. High-tech companies are active in SIC codes
starting with 283, 357, 365, 366, 367, 376, 382, 384, 48, 737, and 8731.
3 Companies that intend to list on the French equity markets have to file their IPO prospectus with the
Commission des Opération de Bourse (COB), the French equivalent of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Firms must gain prior approval of the COB by the granting of a visa (COB regulation
98-01). If the shares are to be listed, a complete prospectus has to be filed with the COB at least 15 days
beforehand. This period is reduced to two days if the firm has previously registered a document de
référence. The latter is comparable to an annual report in that it may serve as a basic disclosure document
although it contains no transaction-specific information. To fill the resulting information gap, a company
relying on a document de référence must file a note d’opération which describes the offered shares and, if
necessary, contains an update of the information in the document de référence. If the shares are to be listed
on the Nouveau Marché, the firm is required to file a prospectus at least two months in advance.
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million. Offering proceeds are defined as the number of shares offered to the public
times the final offer price. Median offering proceeds amount to €7.3 million. The median
number of shares sold to the public equals 20 percent of the shares outstanding after the
IPO. The first-day return, measured as the offer-to-close return on the first day of trade,
averages about 14.4 percent. The average (median) sales for the last 12 month financial
period are equal to €64.4 million (€24.8 million). The cash flow margin is defined as the
sum of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization (EBITDA) and
provision allowances divided by sales for the last 12 months reported in the prospectus.
The cash flow margin is 15.5 percent of sales at the median. Plant, property and
equipment reported on the most recent balance sheet in the prospectus equals  17.9% of
total assets. The median age of IPO firms is 16 years. To calculate the market-to-book
ratio, the market value on the first day of trade is divided by the sum of the proceeds
from the newly issued shares and the book value of equity from the last pre-IPO financial
statement, or when available from a later interim report included in the prospectus. The
market-to-book ratio averages 4.45 and yields 3.65 evaluated at the median.
[Please insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here]
We determine the price-to-book ratio as the preliminary offer value divided by
the pre-IPO book value of equity. Preliminary offer value is computed as the number of
pre-IPO shares outstanding times the preliminary offer price. The preliminary offer price
equals the minimum tender price (auctions) or the midpoint of the price range
(bookbuilding) or the offer price (fixed-price offerings)4. Pre-IPO book value of equity is
taken from the last pre-IPO financial statement, or when available from a later interim
                                                          
4 In France, firms can choose between different IPO selling mechanisms. The Offre à Prix Minimal (OPM)
is a single-bid auction in which a minimum tender price is set beforehand. The auction procedure is
selected by 100 firms in our sample. In a fixed-price offering or Offre à Prix Ferme (OPF) a fixed number
of shares is offered at a fixed price. The fixed-price offering is used by 19 sample firms. Since 1993,
French IPOs can also be made through a placing or Placement Garanti (PG). This procedure corresponds
to the bookbuilding procedure that is used in the United States. The bookbuilding procedure is adopted by
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report included in the prospectus. We find that the price-to-book ratio has an average of
6.84 and a median of 4.95. We compute the price-to-cash flow ratio as the ratio between
the preliminary offer value and the sum of EBITDA and provision allowances for the last
12 month period included in the prospectus. We report an average price-to-cash flow
ratio equal to 12.11 and a median price-to-cash flow ratio of 8.51.
3.2.2. Ownership and voting structure
Table 2 shows the average post-IPO cash flow ownership (Panel A) and voting (Panel B)
structure. The table reports unconditional averages and averages conditional on that
particular class of shareholder owning stock in the IPO firm. Data come from IPO
prospectuses. In France, it is possible to separate voting rights and cash flow rights using
a double voting rule (droit de vote double). However, these multiple voting stocks do not
represent a special category of stocks in France. Under this rule, ordinary shares carry
double votes after holding them for either 2, 3 or 4 years, depending on the provisions in
the company’s statutes. The company is free to adopt the 2, 3 or 4 years holding period
requirement but can only adopt one of these holding periods in its statutes. In our sample,
83% of IPO firms apply a double voting rule, which takes effect after either 2 years
(39.5%), 3 years (8.7%) or 4 years (34.8%). This implies that any shareholder who meets
the holding period requirement of either 2, 3 or 4 years is entitled to cast two votes per
share.  The percentage of votes reported by each pre-IPO shareholder is required to
incorporate any effects of double voting rules.
Another method to separate cash flow and voting rights is a pyramid structure.
The owner-manager is said to be controlling the firm through a pyramid if he controls the
company through another company that he does not completely own. Following La Porta
et al. (1999), we require that the owner-manager controls at least 20% of the votes in
                                                                                                                                                                           
180 firms. For a more detailed discussion of French IPO selling mechanisms see Derrien and Womack
(2003).
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each of the companies in the pyramid. For example, if the owner-manager owns 20% of
the voting and cash flow rights of company A that in turn controls 25% of the votes and
cash flow rights of company B, we say that the owner-manager controls company B
through a two-tier pyramid. Control is measured by the strongest link in its control chain
(in this example 25%). Cash flow ownership is measured as the product of ownership
stakes along the control chain (in this example: 20%*25%=5%). In our sample, 17.4% of
IPO firms apply a two-tier pyramid structure.
Table 2 shows the CEO/owner-manager owns 39.2% of post-IPO cash flow
rights and controls 44.3% of post-IPO votes, on average. Conditional on a CEO/owner-
manager owning stock in the IPO firm, he owns 42.5% of post-IPO cash flow rights and
controls 48% of post-IPO votes. This is much higher than CEO ownership in U.S. IPO
firms5. When we compute the votes per cash flow right (V/C), we observe that
CEOs/owner-managers of French IPO firms have 1.14 votes per post-IPO cash flow
right. This reflects the use of the double voting rule and two-tier pyramiding structures
and has the potential to increase the conflict between the owner-manager and minority
shareholders  because the owner-manager may maintain a lock on control while holding
fewer cash flow rights than voting rights. For instance, CEOs in IPO firms that adopt
two-tier pyramiding structures own 29.9% of cash flow rights, but exercise 42.5% of
post-IPO votes, on average. Other significant post-IPO shareholders are inside directors
(other than the owner-manager), who own 12.1% of post-IPO shares, outside directors
owning 4.6% of post-IPO stock, and venture capitalists that own 8.9 % of post-IPO
shares, on average.
3.2.3.Power of the owner-manager
                                                          
5 Harjoto and Garen (2005) report that the mean CEO stake in U.S. IPO firms during 1996-1997 amounts
to 16.2% of shares directly after the IPO.
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In this study, we employ a game-theoretic power index developed by Banzhaf (1965).
This Z-index captures the probability that the outcome of the voting process changes
when the owner-manager changes his mind unilaterally, assuming that all vectors of
votes are equally likely. The Z-index yields similar results as Shapley values, but has the
advantage that it more easily incorporates the effects of pyramid structures (Crama et al.,
1999). Based on Crama et al. (1999), we illustrate the computation of the Z-index in two
simple cases.
[Please insert Figure 1 about here]
In Panel A of Figure 1, we assume there is one proposal put to the shareholders’ meeting
on which two shareholders (S1 with 3 votes, S2 with 2 votes) have to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
If we assume that the votes are not correlated, there are 4 (22) possible voting series.
There are two voting series where S1 changes his vote while S2 does not. On both
occasions, the final outcome of the voting game changes. Conversely, when S2 changes
his vote, the final outcome does not change. This reflects that S1 has full control over the
company and S2 can therefore not influence the outcome of the voting game. The Z-
index is determined as the ratio between the number of changes in the final outcome
triggered by the change of vote of an individual shareholder and the total number of
changes in the final outcome triggered by all shareholders. In this example, there are two
changes in the final outcome both induced by voting changes of S1. The Z-index thus
equals 100% (2/2) for S1 and 0% (0/2) for S2.
Panel B of Figure 1 shows the second example, with 4 shareholders and 16 (24)
possible voting series. The Z-index now equals 50% for S1 with 3 votes and 16.67% for
each of the other three shareholders with 2 votes. We take into account the effect of
pyramids by first playing the voting game with the shareholders of the holding company
and then with the shareholders of the operating company. For instance, consider the
example shown in Panel B of Figure 1. Assume that S1 is a holding company owned by
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shareholder T1 with 3 votes and shareholder T2 with 2 votes. The Z-index of T1 equals
100% and that of T2 equals 0% at the level of the holding company (as in Panel A of
Figure 1).  At the level of the operating company the same results obtain as in Panel B of
Figure 1. The Z-index equals 50% for T1, 0% for T2 and 16.67% for the three other
shareholders S2, S3 and S4.
We calculate the Z-index under the assumption that all existing IPO shareholders
enter into the voting game (using their post-IPO voting power). The float at the IPO is
constituted of a large number of small investors that are equally divided into ‘yes’ and
‘no’ voters to the proposal. When the CEO/owner-manager owns more than 50% of the
post-IPO votes, he clearly has a lock on control (i.e., Z-index equals 100%). But when
the owner-manager owns less than 50% of the post-IPO votes he can still be in full
control in the absence of any other large shareholders with sufficient votes to beat him in
the voting process. The owner-manager only shares power in case other large
shareholders alone or together are able to successfully oppose him in the voting game.
We therefore argue that the Z-index better measures the power of the owner-manager
than the percentage of votes controlled by the owner-manager. Table 2 (Panel B) shows
that the unconditional average of the Z-index of the owner-manager equals 61.7% with a
conditional average of 66.8%. This shows that, on average, the owner-manager derives
more power from his post-IPO votes because of a more fragmented ownership structure
among the other shareholders. We also divide the Z-index by the cash flow ownership of
the owner-manager to determine power per cash flow right. The average (median) power
per cash flow right equals 1.41 (1.44) power units per cash flow right.
3.2.4. Differences across industries
Table 3 shows the average and median values of selected key variables per industry. We
test for differences in means using a t-test and for differences in medians using the
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test.
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[Please insert Table 3 about here]
We find that non-financial firms have higher market-to-book ratios than manufacturing
firms. These industries do not exhibit any other statistically significant differences. The
technology companies report less plant, property and equipment on their balance sheets
and sell more shares to the public than companies that belong to the other two industry
groups. Technology companies also have a higher market-to-book ratio than companies
from the manufacturing industry. In addition, CEO/owner-managers of technology
companies own less cash flow rights and voting rights (and thus power) than their
counterparts at manufacturing and non-financial services firms.
The differences between the technology firms and the other firms can partially be
attributed to the fact that Nouveau Marché companies dominate the technology sample
(61% of technology companies list on that market segment). Nouveau Marché
companies are subject to listing requirements that require companies to sell at least 20%
of their shares in the IPO, whereas companies that go public on the Second Marché only
have to sell at least 10% of their shares in the IPO. Additionally, for Nouveau Marché
companies at least half of the IPO shares must be newly issued, the shares must be held
by at least 100 different shareholders, and IPO proceeds must be larger than €5 million.
These rules do not apply to Second Marché companies. This implies that Nouveau
Marché companies need to sell more shares to the public and tend to have a more
dispersed post-IPO ownership structure than Second Marché companies. As a result,
CEO/owner-managers of Nouveau Marché companies own less post-IPO shares and
votes than Second Marché companies. This suggest that it is important to control for
industry as well as listing venue in our regression analyses.
3.2.5. Shareholder agreements
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Table 4 describes the provisions contained in shareholder agreements (pactes
d’actionnaires) between the CEO/owner-manager and other pre-IPO shareholders. The
median pact in our sample lasts for 5 years with a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of
20 years. In total 79 (26.4%) IPO firms disclose information regarding shareholder
agreements in their prospectus. We are able to retrieve the provisions contained in the
agreement for 74 IPO firms. The pre-emptive buying rights (droit de préemption) are
most common. These pre-emptive buying rights give the priority buying right to
contracting shareholders if one of the other contracting shareholders wants to sell (part
of) his shares. Another frequently observed provision relates to concerted action (action
de concert), which entails that contracting shareholders agree to meet before the general
meeting to discuss strategic issues. About 17% of contracting shareholders agree to
jointly retain a majority control block (pacte de majorité) of at least 50% of post-IPO
votes in the firm. Joint exit (droit de sortie) is a provision that forces contracting
(minority) shareholders to sell on the same terms as the controlling shareholder in case
the latter decides to accept a tender offer for his shares. Provisions regarding board
representation (clause de répartition) prescribe board composition between the
contracting shareholders and are made in 16.2% of shareholder agreements.
[Please insert Table 4 about here]
Table 4 also shows that inside directors (other than the CEO) are the most common
contracting parties, followed by venture capitalists and industrial companies. All
contracting shareholders (including the CEO/owner-manager) own an average (median)
of 74.3% (78.4%) of post-IPO votes.
3.3. Multiple regression analysis
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The data are analyzed using multiple regression analysis. Throughout the paper, we use
White (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors to compute t-statistics. We use
the natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity as our proxy for firm value.
The market-to-book ratio reflects the valuation of the firm from the perspective of the
minority shareholder who does not enjoy any private benefits of control (La Porta et al.,
2002). Market-to-book ratio is censored at its 5th and 95th percentile. This resolves
potential problems with extreme observations. In sensitivity analyses, we employ
alternative dependent variables such as the price-to-book ratio and the price-to-cash flow
ratio. We employ several control variables in our regressions, such as the natural
logarithm of sales to control for differences in firm size. We include company age in the
regressions as an ex-ante proxy for risk and the cash flow margin to control for
differences in profitability between IPO firms. Cash flow margin is censored at its 5th and
95th percentile. We control for differences in asset tangibility by including plant, property
and equipment (expressed as a percentage of total assets) into the regression model. We
also incorporate time fixed effects (i.e., a set of year dummies for the years 1993 to
1998) and two industry dummies (for technology and manufacturing firms with non-
financial services firms as a reference category). This is important given the differences
between high-technology companies vis-à-vis companies from the non-financial services
and manufacturing industry (see section 3.2.4). We include a dummy indicating whether
the IPO took place on the Nouveau Marché to control for potential differences in listing
venue. Table 5 shows the definition of the variables included in the regressions.
[Please insert Table 5 about here]
We regress firm value on the post-IPO cash flow ownership of the owner-
manager to test Hypothesis 1a. We also include the square of post-IPO cash flow
ownership of the owner-manager to examine a possible non-linear relation between cash
flow ownership of the owner-manager and IPO firm value (Hypothesis 1b). To test
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Hypothesis 2 we introduce the votes per cash flow right variable, defined as the ratio of
voting to cash flow rights in the hands of the owner-manager, in the regression analysis.
Hypothesis 3 is tested by including a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the
CEO/owner-manger has entered into a shareholder agreement and zero otherwise. We
include the power per cash flow right variable, defined as the Z-index of post-IPO power
of the owner-manager divided by his cash flow ownership, in the regression to test
Hypothesis 4. We compute variance inflation factors to determine whether
multicollinearity is a significant problem. With two exceptions all variance inflation
factors of the independent variables are lower than ten6. This indicates that
multicollinearity is not a severe problem in our analysis.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Ownership and control
Table 6 presents the results of the regression analyses used to test the hypotheses. In
Model (1) we regress IPO firm value, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, on the
cash flow ownership of the owner-manager and its square. We find that cash flow
ownership of the owner-manager is significantly related to IPO firm value (p<0.05) in
the manner predicted by Hypothesis 1a. However, this relation is curvilinear as the
coefficient on the square of the cash flow ownership of the owner-manager is
significantly negative (p<0.10).  This supports Hypothesis 1b. Our findings suggest that,
ceteris paribus, IPO firm value increases until the post-IPO cash flow ownership of the
owner-manager reaches 56.7% (the inflection point) and declines beyond that. This
inflection point is higher than the 40 to 50% that McConnell and Servaes (1990) report
                                                          
6 Variance inflation factors (VIFs) in excess of 10 suggest multicollinearity problems. The highest inflation
factors are inherently associated with cash flow ownership of the CEO/owner-manager (VIF=19.56) and
its square (VIF=18.29).
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for the United States7. However, their study does not consider IPO firms. Moreover, the
higher inflection point in France is consistent with the model of Wu and Wang (2004)
that predicts higher value-maximizing levels of inside ownership when private benefits
are large (such as in France) compared to situations where private benefits are small (in
countries with strong legal systems such as the United States).
Model (2) adds the owner-manager’s votes per cash flow right as an independent
variable. This captures the extent to which the owner-manager has separated his voting
and cash flow rights. In support of Hypothesis 2 we find a negative association between
the votes per cash flow right variable and IPO firm value (p<0.05). The inflection point
equals 54.1%. Model (3) incorporates a dummy that equals one if the owner-manager has
entered into a shareholder agreement with other pre-IPO owners. We find that the
existence of a shareholder agreement is positively related to firm value (p<0.05),
consistent with Hypothesis 3 and recent theoretical work of Chemla et al. (2002). After
inclusion of the shareholder agreement dummy,  the inflection point increases to 65%.
We argue that the presence of shareholder agreements enables the owner-manager to
own more stock in the company without investors viewing him as becoming entrenched
because he is sharing control with other pre-IPO shareholders.
Next, Model (4) includes the power per cash flow right of the owner-manager.
We find strong support for Hypothesis 4. The power per cash flow right variable is
negatively related to IPO firm value and its regression coefficient is highly significant
(p<0.01). The inflection point equals 52.5%. This  finding is consistent with Thomsen et
al. (2005). They show that there is a discount associated with a high degree ownership
concentration in Continental Europe.
[Please insert Table 6 about here]
                                                          
7 We should be careful in comparing our results with those of other studies. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Short and Keasey (1999) all investigate samples of larger
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In Model (5) we jointly analyze the cash flow ownership of the owner-manager
and its square, the votes per cash flow right, shareholder agreements and the power per
cash flow right. In accordance with Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we find that the cash flow
ownership of the owner-manager is positively related to IPO firm value (p<0.01) and that
this relationship is curvilinear (p<0.05).  Again, we find that the presence of a
shareholder agreement (p<0.05) is positively related to IPO firm value. The power per
cash flow right variable is negatively related to IPO firm value (p<0.01). Although the
negative relation between the votes per cash flow right and IPO firm value persists, it
lacks statistical significance at conventional levels. The inflection point in Model (5)
equals 55.3%. Our results show that incentive and entrenchment effects can go together
and that shareholder agreements are positively related to IPO firm value.
4.2. Robustness checks
One possible problem with our analysis in the previous section is that we did not take
endogeneity between ownership and value into account (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985;
Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). We first test for endogeneity using using the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test as augmented by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). This test can be
formed by including the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side variable, as a
function of all exogenous variables, in a regression of the original model to test whether
the coefficients on the residuals are significantly different from zero. We find that firm
value measured by the market-to-book ratio is not endogenous to CEO cash flow
ownership (p=0.79) 8. We also checked whether firm value is endogeneous to the power
                                                                                                                                                                           
publicly traded companies in the U.S. and the U.K. As Kole (1995) shows differences in the size of sample
firms can lead to different findings in these type of studies.
8 Although the test rejects endogeneity, we have used the instrumental variables (2SLS) technique to
address a potential endogeneity problem. We use two valid instruments for CEO cash flow ownership:
CEO founder status (a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO/owner-manager founded the company)
and CEO tenure (the number of years the CEO/owner-manager has been employed by the company). We
find that the coefficient on the cash flow ownership held by the CEO/owner-manager variable continues to
be significantly positive (p<0.05) in the second stage regression. This suggests that endogeneity is not a
major problem in our analysis.
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of the CEO as measured by the Z-index. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test suggests it is not
(p=0.85).
Next, we re-estimate all regressions using pre-IPO rather than post-IPO
ownership. Pre-IPO ownership is by definition not determined by selling behavior at the
IPO. We find similar relationships between pre-IPO ownership variables and firm value
as we did for post-IPO ownership variables and firm value (results not tabulated).
To further check the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate Model (5) of
Table 6 without time fixed effects and without the votes per cash flow right variable that
was insignificant in previous regressions. Table 7 shows the results. We find
qualitatively similar results. Then we divide the sample into 201 Second Marché IPO
firms and 98 Nouveau Marché IPO firms. As a natural consequence, dividing the sample
into two subsets reduces the power of the tests.
[Please insert Table 7 about here]
We find that the curvilinear relationship between cash flow ownership and IPO
firm value is invariant to listing venue. However, cash flow ownership squared is only
significantly related to firm value for the Nouveau Marché sample. The shareholder
agreement dummy and the power per cash flow right variable are only significantly
related to IPO firm value for the Second Marché sample. This suggests that private
benefits of control may play a more important role for this group. We also use alternative
dependent variables. We re-estimate Model (5) of Table 6 using the price-to-book ratio
as the dependent variable and without the votes per cash flow right variable. We find that
our findings are invariant to using this alternative dependent variable. We also use the
price-to-cash flow ratio as an alternative dependent variable. Again, qualitatively similar
results are found. We also re-estimate Model (5) of Table 6 by substituting power per
cash flow right with a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the Z-index equals
100%. This measures whether the owner-manager is in full control over the IPO firm.
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We find that the coefficient on this dummy equals –0.257 (p<0.01).  For reasons of
brevity, these results are not tabulated.
We have used the market-to-book ratio of assets as an alternative dependent
variable. The market-to-book ratio of assets is computed as the sum of the market value
of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets from the most
recent financial statement included in the prospectus. We find qualitatively similar
results. We have also included dummy variables that indicate the identity of non-
management owners in the company (venture capitalists, industrial companies and
financial investors). None of the coefficients on these dummy variables is statistically
significant. We argue that it is not the identity of the non-management owner that
matters, but the fact that non-management owners are sufficiently powerful to oppose the
owner-manager.
We have also considered other forms of the relationship between cash flow
ownership and IPO firm value. For example, Morck et al. (1988) and Short and Keasey
(1999) find evidence to support an incentive-entrenchment-incentive effect in the
relationship between ownership and firm value. We adopt the approach of Short and
Keasey (1999) and re-estimate our regression models using a cubic form of the
relationship (i.e., adding the cube of the cash flow ownership of the owner-manager in
the regressions). We find that the coefficient on the cube of cash flow ownership is not
significant in any of the regressions (not reported). Overall, our findings suggest that the
results are not spurious but instead reflect a definite structure within the data that is
supportive of Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 3 and 4.
4.3. Private benefits of control
Throughout our analysis we have assumed that an important motivation for managers to
entrench is the presence of large private benefits of control. But what are these private
benefits of control? Although they are difficult to measure empirically, we attempt to
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develop proxies for private benefits of control. We divide the sample into Second
Marché and Nouveau Marché companies to investigate whether there are any differences
in private benefits of control between these two markets. Table 8 shows the results of our
univariate tests for the entire sample and the two subsamples. We first look at nepotism.
If control resides with owner-managers they may use their controlling position to appoint
family members (by blood or marriage) as non-executive directors. We find the
percentage of family directors is significantly larger when the owner-manager is in full
control. In particular, we report that, on average, family directors occupy 27 [14.6]
percent of board seats in Second Marché [Nouveau Marché] companies with full owner-
manager control (Z-index=1) vis-à-vis 7.8 [5.8] percent in partially-controlled Second
Marché [Nouveau Marché] companies (Z-index<1).
In France, companies can choose whether they adopt a second-tier or a one-tier
board structure. The one-tier board structure combines the positions of CEO and
chairman into that of Président Directeur Général (PDG). According to French
corporate law, the PDG is selected by the board, which in turn is then appointed by
shareholders. In practice, it is often the PDG that appoints the board, a choice which is
then ratified by the shareholders. The second-tier structure consists of a management
board (Directoire) and a supervisory board (Conseil de Surveillance). Supervisory board
members are outside directors that are appointed and dismissed by the shareholders’
meeting. The CEO can exert little influence on supervisory board appointments. We
expect that owner-managers that are in full control are less likely to adopt the two-tier
board because this board structure separates the positions of CEO and chairman and
allows for less influence on board appointments. Accordingly, we find that the two-tier
board structure is adopted by 5.1 [2.5] percent of Second Marché [Nouveau Marché]
companies with full owner-manager control (Z-index=1) vis-à-vis 22.1 [15.5] percent in
partially-controlled Second Marché [Nouveau Marché] companies (Z-index<1), on
average.
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We use board compensation as a measure for self-dealing. In France, companies
are not required to disclose cash compensation for individual directors. We therefore take
the aggregate cash compensation from the year before the IPO and divide this by the
number of board seats. We find that the average board member of Second Marché
[Nouveau Marché] companies earns €17,200 [€13,500] less cash compensation when the
owner-manager is in full control (Z-index=1) than when the owner-manager has to share
control with other shareholders (Z-index<1). This suggests that owner-managers with full
control do not use their power to extract excessive cash compensation. If anything,
owner-managers with full control earn less cash compensation than owner-manages with
partial control.
[Please insert Table 8 about here]
The lock on control may also be motivated by status and prestige. We capture this
by looking at whether the last name of the owner-manager and firm name are the same.
We find that only a few owner-managers of Nouveau Marché companies give their
family name to the firm. However, we report that 25.4 percent of Second Marché
companies with full owner-manager control (Z-index=1) have the same name as the
family name of the owner-manager versus 6 percent in partially-controlled Second
Marché companies (Z-index<1). This suggests that owner-managers derive private
benefits from being in control of a company that carries their family name.
As a final point, we look at whether the firm is a regional business. A regional
business is defined as a firm headquartered outside Paris, Lyon, Marseille and Lille (the
four largest cities with more than one million inhabitants).  We argue that the owner-
manager of a regional business derives status from being an important employer in a
local community. This measure is based on Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003). They find that
German family-owned IPO firms are more likely to use dual class shares when they are
important employers in a small town. We find that 51.7 [42.5] percent of Second Marché
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[Nouveau Marché] companies with full owner-manager control (Z-index=1) are regional
businesses vis-à-vis 37.4 [29.3] percent of partially-controlled Second Marché [Nouveau
Marché] companies (Z-index<1), on average. However, the difference is not significant
for the Nouveau Marché. Overall, we conclude that, consistent with Hypothesis 5,
private benefits of control are greater for owner-managers that have decided to keep full
control over the IPO firm, especially for Second Marché IPO firms.
5. Summary and conclusions
Going public often creates an agency conflict between the owner-manager and minority
shareholders. This problem is especially severe in countries with poor legal protection,
such as France. We examine the controlling position of owner-managers in French IPO
firms and disentangle their cash flow rights and voting power. We relate both of them to
IPO firm value.
We find that the relationship between firm value and the owner-manager’s post-
IPO cash flow ownership is positive when the owner-manager is not in full control. As
his cash flow ownership increases, the owner-manager will bear more of the wealth
consequences of enjoying private benefits and he will have incentives to reduce them.
However, for higher levels of cash flow ownership, entrenchment effects start to
outweigh the incentive effect. We find that investors anticipate the increased agency
conflict associated with a lock on control, and lower firm value when the owner-manager
is more powerful. The inflection point at which cash flow ownership becomes negatively
related to firm value varies between 50% and 60%, depending on the model
specification.
To disentangle incentive and entrenchment effects, we focus on the post-IPO
power of the owner-manager vis-à-vis other shareholders, which we measure using
Banzhaf’s (1965) Z-index, a game-theoretic power index. We find that that owner-
manager’s power per cash flow right is negatively related to IPO firm value. This
26
entrenchment effect is invariant to the use of alternative measures of IPO firm value and
represents the price of power. Moreover, we refine our analysis of power in the IPO firm
by examining shareholder agreements. By reaching an agreement with other pre-IPO
shareholders, the owner-manager commits to reducing his private benefit consumption.
As predicted by recent theoretical work of Chemla et al. (2002), we find that the
presence of shareholder agreements is positively related to IPO firm value.
The entrenchment effect provides indirect evidence of expropriation of minority
shareholders by the owner-manager. But what are these private benefits of control?
Several recent studies, such as Yermack (2004) and Rajan and Wulf (2004), have started
to answer this question. We add to this literature and show that full control of the owner-
manager correlates with board appointments of family members (nepotism) and the use
of a one-tier rather than two-tier board structure (power and prestige). This suggests that
the owner-manager increases his power over the board selection process. We also find
that the owner-manager retains full control when the firm carries his family name and
when the firm is an important employer in its region (status). These results are consistent
with the idea that owner-managers of IPO firms keep in control if they derive large non-
pecuniary private benefits from their controlling positions. As predicted by agency
theory, minority shareholders price-protect themselves against this potential value loss
by reducing the price they are willing to pay for the shares in the IPO.
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Figure 1: Computing the Z-index
Panel A: 2 shareholders Panel B: 4 shareholders
● S1 has 3 votes ● S1 has 3 votes
● S2 has 2 votes ● S2, S3, and S4 each have 2
votes
Voting series # Possible voting
choices
Final
outcome
Possible voting
choices
Final
outcome
S1 S2 S1 S2 S3 S4
1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
3 No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
4 No No No Yes Yes No No Yes
5 Yes No Yes Yes Yes
6 Yes No Yes No Yes
7 Yes No No Yes Yes
8 Yes No No No No
9 No Yes Yes Yes Yes
10 No Yes Yes No No
11 No Yes No Yes No
12 No Yes No No No
13 No No Yes Yes No
14 No No Yes No No
15 No No No Yes No
16 No No No No No
Total number of voting
series
4 16
Number of changes in final
outcome caused by a change
of vote by S1
2 6
Number of changes in final
outcome caused by a change
of vote by S2, S3, or S4
0 2
Total number of changes in
final outcome
2 12
Z-Index S1 100%
(2/2)
50%
(6/12)
Z-Index S2 0%
(0/2)
16.7%
(2/12)
Z-Index S3 NA 16.7%
(2/12)
Z-Index S4 NA 16.7%
(2/12)
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Table 1: Firm and offer characteristics
The sample consists of 299 French IPO firms from January 1993 to December 1999. Market value is measured as the number of shares outstanding after the
IPO times the closing price on the first trading day (in million €). Proceeds are defined as the number of shares offered to the public times the final offer price
(in million €). Shares sold to the public is computed as the number of shares that are offered in the IPO divided by the number of shares outstanding after the
IPO. First-day return (underpricing) is the percentage difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and the final offer price. Sales pertain to
the last 12 month period reported in the prospectus. Cash flow margin is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization (EBITDA) and
provision allowances to sales for the last 12 months reported in the prospectus. Cash flow margin is censored at its 5th and 95th percentile (i.e., all values
below the 5th percentile are replaced with the value of the 5th percentile, while all values above the 95th percentile are substituted with the value of the 95th
percentile). Plant, property and equipment is taken from the last pre-IPO balance sheet, or when available from a later interim balance sheet as disclosed in the
prospectus. It is expressed as a percentage of total assets. Company age is the difference between the IPO year and the founding year in the prospectus.
Market-to-book ratio of equity is the ratio of the market value on the first day of trade and the sum of the proceeds from the newly issued shares and the book
value of equity from the last pre-IPO financial statement, or when available from a later interim report included in the prospectus. Market-to-book ratio of
equity is censored at its 5th and 95th percentile. Price-to-book ratio is the ratio of the preliminary offer value to the pre-IPO book value of equity from the last
pre-IPO financial statement, or when available from a later interim report included in the prospectus. The preliminary offer value equals the number of pre-
IPO shares times the minimum tender price (in case of auctioned IPOs), the midpoint of the price range (in case of bookbuilt IPOs) or the fixed-offer price (in
case of fixed-price offerings). Price-to-cash flow ratio equals the ratio between the preliminary offer value and the sum of  earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, amortization (EBITDA) and provision allowances for the last 12 month period reported in the prospectus.
Variable Mean Min Percentiles Max Std.dev.
25th 50th 75th
Market value (million €) 76.01 10.70 24.09 40.84 87.24 827.00 97.96
Proceeds (million €) 13.52 1.31 4.68 7.36 15.06 103.93 16.72
Shares sold to public (%) 22.19 3.51 14.28 20.00 28.63 71.75 10.61
First-day return (%) 14.37 -26.99 0.00 6.90 19.95 136.30 23.85
Sales (million €) 64.35 0.20 11.72 24.77 66.95 942.52 115.39
Cash flow margin (%) 16.95 2.12 10.69 15.52 21.63 39.12 9.14
Plant, property and equipment (%) 17.89 0.21 5.21 13.46 25.38 84.55 16.04
Company age (years) 27.21 1.00 9.00 16.00 28.50 250.00 33.47
Market-to-book ratio 4.45 1.45 2.70 3.65 5.06 11.62 2.66
Price-to-book ratio 6.85 1.36 2.92 4.95 8.57 21.50 5.40
Price-to-cash flow ratio 12.11 1.90 5.27 8.51 15.12 40.23 9.96
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Table 2: Post-IPO cash flow ownership and voting structure
This table shows the average, median, minimum and maximum cash flow ownership (Panel A) and voting (Panel B) percentages for different categories of
shareholders. The shares and votes may be held directly and indirectly via a pyramiding structure. Ownership and voting percentages are averaged
unconditional and conditional on that particular category of shareholder being present (N denotes the number of IPO firms in which that category of
shareholder owns stock). Cash flow ownership and voting structure are different because of pyramiding and/or double voting systems. The Président
Directeur Général (PDG) in the one-tier board structure and the Président du Directoire in the two-tier structure are classified as Chief Executive Officer
(CEO). In our sample, there are 33 IPO firms that apply the two-tier board structure. Inside directors are board members that are current managers of the
company (other than the CEO/owner-manager). Outside directors are board members without day-to-day management responsibility. Institutional investors
include banks, insurance companies and pension funds. The Z-index measures the power of the CEO/owner-manager versus other shareholders in a voting
game (see Figure 1). Power per cash flow right (P/C) is the ratio of the Z-index and the cash flow ownership of the owner-manager. V/C denotes votes per
cash flow right. NA denotes not applicable.
Panel A: Cash flow rights
Shareholder identity Unconditional Conditional
Average Median Std.dev. Min. Max. Average Median Std.dev. Min. Max. N
CEO/owner-manager 39.23 38.75 27.43 0.00 89.49 42.50 43.11 26.00 0.01 89.49 276
Inside directors 12.09 4.92 15.43 0.00 79.95 16.97 12.47 15.86 0.01 79.95 213
Outside directors 4.57 0.00 11.88 0.00 67.11 11.88 3.85 16.77 0.01 67.11 103
Venture capitalists 8.86 0.00 14.91 0.00 72.40 19.19 14.26 16.85 0.49 72.40 138
Industrial companies 5.21 0.00 16.36 0.00 86.30 32.47 20.13 28.17 0.53 86.3 48
Institutional investors 3.36 0.00 10.73 0.00 83.07 16.22 11.41 18.73 0.23 83.07 62
Panel B: Voting rights
Shareholder identity Unconditional Conditional
Average Median Std.dev. Min. Max. Average Median Std.dev. Min. Max. V/C N
CEO/owner-manager 44.32 45.87 30.36 0.00 94.16 48.01 49.30 28.65 0.01 94.16 1.14 276
       Z-index 61.68 100.00 42.60 0.00 100.00 66.81 100.00 40.27 0.00 100.00 NA 276
       P/C 1.41 1.44 0.90 0.00 5.15 1.53 1.50 0.84 0.00 5.15 NA 276
Inside directors 11.91 3.29 16.35 0.00 79.95 16.72 11.16 17.18 0.01 79.95 0.96 213
Outside directors 4.72 0.00 13.00 0.00 73.61 12.26 2.98 18.66 0.01 73.61 1.03 103
Venture capitalists 8.65 0.00 15.51 0.00 80.39 18.75 13.10 18.23 0.18 80.39 0.94 138
Industrial companies 5.15 0.00 16.97 0.00 91.70 32.09 17.77 30.70 0.39 91.70 0.94 48
Institutional investors 3.28 0.00 10.97 0.00 84.38 15.80 10.09 19.67 0.01 84.38 0.95 62
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Table 3: Selected key variables per industry
This table shows the unconditional average and median [in brackets] of selected key variables per industry. Market-to-book ratio, plant, property
and equipment (expressed as a percentage of total assets) and shares sold to the public (expressed as a percentage of total shares outstanding
after the IPO)  are defined in Table 1.  Post-IPO cash flow rights and votes held by the CEO/owner-manager as well as the Z-index are defined
as in Table 2. We test for differences in mean using a t-test and for differences in median using the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test. Test statistics
are reported in the last three columns [test-statistics for the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test are reported in brackets]. * significant at the 10% level;
** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Manufacturing
(N=100)
Non-
financial
services
(N=112)
High-
technology
(N=87)
Test for
difference
manufacturing
and non-
financial
services
Test for
difference
manufacturing
and high-
technology
Test for
difference
non-financial
services and
high-technology
Market-to-book ratio 3.64
[3.20]
4.77
[3.86]
4.97
[4.00]
3.166***
[2.707]***
3.900***
[4.066]***
0.492
[1.102]
Plant, property and equipment
(%)
20.36
[18.10]
21.52
[14.94]
10.40
[6.84]
0.498
[1.349]
6.092***
[6.461]***
4.613***
[3.972]***
Shares sold to public (%) 21.05
[19.02]
20.95
[18.79]
24.54
[24.75]
0.070
[0.273]
2.255**
[2.907]***
2.515**
[2.972]***
Cash flow rights CEO/owner-
manager
41.91
[45.49]
42.97
[45.77]
31.32
[28.21]
0.268
[0.364]
2.668***
[2.209]**
3.256***
[3.046]***
Voting rights CEO/owner-
manager
46.47
[53.43]
49.21
[54.93]
35.54
[31.76]
0.627
[0.615]
2.506**
[2.111]*
3.404***
[3.182]***
Z-index 63.91
[1.00]
67.02
[1.00]
52.19
[33.00]
0.532
[0.392]
1.842*
[1.305]
2.564**
[2.289]**
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Table 4: Shareholder agreements
The sample consists of 79 IPO firms that disclose information regarding shareholder
agreements (pactes d’actionnaires) between the CEO/owner-manager and other pre-IPO
shareholders. The table shows the provisions included in the shareholder agreement
(available for 74 IPO firms) and the other contracting shareholders (other than the
CEO/owner-manager). Please note that a shareholder agreement may contain more than one
provision and may be signed by more than two contracting parties (this explains why the
columns do not add up to 100%).
Provisions in shareholder agreements
Preemptive buying right 71.62%
Concerted action 45.95%
Majority block 17.57%
Joint exit 18.92%
Board representation 16.22%
Shareholders that are contracting with CEO/owner-manager
Inside directors 65.82%
Industrial companies 12.65%
Venture capitalists 21.52%
Institutional investors 8.86%
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Table 5: Definition of variables
Variable name Description
Market-to-book ratio Ratio of the first-day market capitalization and the post-issue book
value of equity. The post-issue book value of equity equals the sum of
the primary offering proceeds (i.e., number of newly issued shares
times the offer price) and the book value of equity from the last pre-
IPO financial statement, or when available from a later interim
statement as disclosed in the prospectus. Market-to-book ratio of
equity is censored at its 5th and 95th percentile
Price-to-book ratio Ratio of the preliminary offer value to the pre-IPO book value of
equity from the last pre-IPO financial statement, or when available
from a later interim report included in the prospectus. The preliminary
offer value equals the number of pre-IPO shares times the minimum
tender price (in case of auctioned IPOs), the midpoint of the price
range (in case of bookbuilt IPOs) or the fixed-offer price (in case of
fixed-price offerings)
Price-to-cash flow ratio Ratio of the preliminary offer value and the earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, amortization (EBITDA) and provision allowances
for the last 12 month period reported in the prospectus
Cash flow ownership owner-
manager
Post-IPO stock cash flow ownership of the CEO/owner-manager. The
ownership is expressed as a percentage of post-IPO shares outstanding
(Cash flow ownership owner-
manager)2
Cash flow ownership of the owner-manager squared
Votes per cash flow right Ratio of post-IPO voting rights and cash flow rights in the hands of the
CEO/owner-manager
Shareholder agreement dummy Equal to one if the CEO/owner-manager has entered into a shareholder
agreement with other pre-IPO shareholders,  zero otherwise
Power per cash flow right Ratio of Z-index of voting power of owner-manager and cash flow
ownership of owner-manager. The Z-index is a game-theoretic power
index that measures the probability that the outcome of the voting
process changes when the owner-manager changes his mind
unilaterally, assuming that all vectors of votes are equally likely (see
Figure 1)
Sales Sales (in millions €) during the last 12 month financial period reported
in the prospectus
Age Difference between the IPO year and the founding year in the
prospectus
Cash flow margin Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization
(EBITDA) and provision allowances to sales for the last 12 months
reported in the prospectus. Cash flow margin is censored at its 5th and
95th percentile
Plant, property and equipment Plant, property and equipment expressed as a percentage of total assets.
Plant, property and equipment is taken from the last pre-IPO balance
sheet, or when available from a later interim balance sheet as disclosed
in the prospectus
Technology dummy Equal to one if a company belongs to the technology sector, zero
otherwise
Manufacturing dummy Equal to one if a company belongs to the manufacturing sector, zero
otherwise
Nouveau Marché dummy Equal to one if a company is listed on the Nouveau Marché, zero
otherwise
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Table 6: Incentive and entrenchment effects
Models (1-5) are estimated through least-squares regressions. We use the natural logarithm of
the market-to-book ratio of equity as the dependent variable in all regressions. All variables
are defined in Table 5. Heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics are within parentheses. *
significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. The
inflection point is the point at which the owner-manager becomes entrenched and his
ownership becomes negatively related to firm value.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Cash flow ownership
owner-manager
0.842
(2.051)**
1.213
(2.682)***
0.723
(1.715)*
1.614
(3.405)***
1.547
(3.252)***
(Cash flow ownership
owner-manager)2
-0.743
(-1.652)*
-1.122
(-2.189)**
-0.556
(-1.642)*
-1.537
(-2.890)***
-1.398
(-2.562)**
Votes per cash flow right -0.155
(-2.149)**
-0.048
(-0.581)
Shareholder agreement
dummy
0.128
(1.998)**
0.136
(2.068)**
Power per cash flow right -0.127
(-3.450)***
-0.118
(-2.734)***
Control variables
Log(1+sales) -0.096
(-2.562)**
-0.101
(-2.734)***
-0.097
(-2.672)***
-0.103
(-2.800)***
-0.106
(-2.981)***
Log(1+age) -0.106
(-2.357)**
-0.102
(-2.239)**
-0.102
(-2.325)**
-0.105
(-2.383)**
-0.099
(-2.324)**
Cash flow margin 0.951
(2.514)**
0.916
(2.502)**
0.876
(2.348)**
0.927
(2.554)**
0.838
(2.364)**
Plant, property and
equipment
-0.774
(-3.053)***
-0.823
(-3.172)***
-0.761
(-3.093)***
-0.804
(-3.237)***
-0.803
(-3.280)***
Technology dummy 0.015
(0.184)
0.004
(0.058)
0.021
(0.252)
0.007
(0.091)
0.011
(0.133)
Manufacturing dummy -0.189
(-2.592)**
-0.204
(-2.807)***
-0.185
(-2.549)**
-0.196
(-2.723)***
-0.195
(-2.763)***
Nouveau Marché dummy -0.347
(-4.205)***
-0.342
(-4.400)***
-0.327
(-3.874)***
-0.308
(-3.699)***
-0.286
(-3.373)***
Intercept 2.125
(9.654)***
2.254
(9.888)***
2.089
(9.406)***
2.210
(10.119)***
2.206
(9.802)***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 adjusted (%) 24.257 25.038 25.027 26.749 27.465
F-statistic 7.362*** 7.221*** 7.217*** 7.801*** 7.269***
Inflection point (%) 56.7 54.1 65.0 52.5 55.3
Number of observations 299 299 299 299 299
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Table 7: Robustness checks
We conduct several sensitivity analyses. In Columns (1) we re-estimate Model (5) of Table 6
without year dummies and without the votes per cash flow right variable. In Columns (2) and
(3) we re-estimate Model (5) of Table 6 for 201 Second Marché IPO firms and for 98
Nouveau Marché IPO firms, respectively. We also use alternative dependent variables to
capture IPO firm value. In Column (4) we use the price-to-book ratio. In Column (5) we use
the price-to-cash flow ratio as the dependent variable. All variables are defined in Table 5.
Heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics are within parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; **
significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
Market-to-book ratio of equity
All IPO
firms
Second
Marché
Nouveau
Marché
Price-to-
book ratio
Price-to-
cash flow
ratio
Cash flow ownership
owner-manager
1.440
(3.157)***
1.049
(1.694)*
2.144
(2.345)**
1.815
(3.446)***
2.749
(3.953)***
(Cash flow ownership
owner-manager)2
-1.237
(-2.322)**
-0.827
(-1.171)
-2.455
(-2.092)**
-1.705
(-2.843)***
-2.692
(-3.602)***
Shareholder agreement
dummy
0.146
(2.144)**
0.196
(2.292)**
0.089
(0.752)
0.135
(1.651)*
0.127
(1.663)*
Power per cash flow right -0.114
(-3.233)***
-0.126
(-2.492)**
-0.073
(-1.272)
-0.216
(-5.239)***
-0.243
(-3.928)***
Control variables
Log(1+sales) -0.111
(-3.177)***
-0.152
(-3.614)***
0.014
(0.211)
-0.167
(-3.852)***
-0.085
(-1.703)*
Log(1+age) -0.093
(-2.164)**
-0.095
(-1.907)*
-0.085
(-1.055)
-0.150
(-2.858)***
-0.025
(-0.436)
Cash flow margin 0.624
(1.684)*
0.476
(0.853)
0.673
(1.225)
0.119
(0.247)
1.110
(1.829)*
Plant, property and
equipment
-0.835
(-3.372)***
-0.987
(-2.804)***
-0.277
(-0.865)
-0.445
(-1.421)
-1.246
(-4.247)***
Technology dummy 0.005
(0.055)
-0.080
(-0.677)
0.142
(1.130)
-0.001
(-0.005)
-0.185
(-1.604)
Manufacturing dummy -0.194
(-2.706)***
-0.246
(-3.030)***
-0.075
(-0.459)
-0.281
(-3.284)***
-0.201
(-2.508)**
Nouveau Marché dummy -0.209
(-2.443)**
0.305
(2.783)***
0.606
(5.961)***
Intercept 2.001
(9.462)***
2.319
(8.470)***
1.174
(3.807)***
2.455
(8.442)***
2.344
(6.662)***
Year dummies No No No Yes Yes
R2 adjusted (%) 24.311 30.750 5.655 40.756 33.232
F-statistic 9.702*** 9.881*** 1.581 13.059*** 9.725***
Inflection point (%) 58.2 63.4 43.7 53.2 51.1
Number of observations 299 201 98 299 299
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Table 8: Private benefits of control
This table shows averages for five proxies for private benefits of control. We split the sample
firms both by full control (Z-index=1) versus shared control (Z-index<1) and by stock market
segment (Second Marché versus Nouveau Marché). We measure the number of family
directors related to the owner-manager (by blood or marriage) that serve on the board as a
non-executive director and divide this by the total number of executive and non-executive
directors. This proxies for nepotism. The two-tier board is a dummy variable that equals one
if the owner-manager adopts the two-tier board structure, 0 otherwise. This proxies for power
and prestige. Salary is the cash compensation of the entire board in the year before the IPO,
divided by the total number of executive and non-executive directors. This proxies for self-
dealing. Family name is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm carries the family name
of the owner-manager. This proxies for status and prestige. Regional business is a dummy
variable that equals one if the company is located outside Paris, Lyon, Marseille and Lille
(the four largest French cities with more than one million inhabitants). Owner-managers of
regional businesses are more likely to be important employers in that region, which gives
them more status in their local community.
Z-index=1 Z-index<1 t-statistic
All IPO firms
Family directors 23.89% 7.00% 7.905***
Two-tier board 4.43% 18.44% 3.946***
Salary (‘000) 86.83 99.17 2.490**
Family name 40.32% 20.25% 4.256***
Regional business 49.37% 34.04% 2.703***
Number of observations 158 141
Second Marché
Family directors 27.04% 7.83% 7.198***
Two-tier board 5.08% 22.06% 3.459***
Salary (‘000) 92.02 109.20 2.815***
Family name 25.42% 6.02% 3.672***
Regional business 51.69% 37.35% 2.020**
Number of observations 118 83
Nouveau Marché
Family directors 14.60% 5.83% 2.540**
Two-tier board 2.50% 15.52% 2.119**
Salary (‘000) 71.11 84.61 1.676*
Family name 5.00% 1.72% 0.920
Regional business 42.50% 29.30% 1.347
Number of observations 40 58
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